Per Baltzer Overgaard, Professor and Associate Dean for International Accreditations
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Professor 2003 ->; Assoc. Prof. 1993-2003; Asst. Prof. 1990-1993
Per Baltzer Overgaard is Professor and Associate Dean for International Accreditations at Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University. He was previously Vice-Dean for Research and Talent (2011 - 2021) and Head of the School of Economics and Management (2006 - 2011). He received his PhD from CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium, 1991, and holds an MA (Econ) from Warwick University, UK, 1986. He has studied at Aarhus University (1981 – 85), Warwick University (1985 – 86), CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain (1987 – 89), and UCLA (1989 – 90). He has been a member of the Council for Social Sciences and Business, Independent Research Fund Denmark (2006 - 2010), and he is presently a member of the Danish Rail Regulatory Authority (Jernbanenævnet) (since 2010), the CEPOS Centre Council (since 2007), as well as the Sideline Employment Board (Bibeskæftigelsesnævnet) (since 2020).
Per Baltzer Overgaard’s primary research interests are in Information, Contract Theory, Auction Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Business Strategy, Antitrust and Business Regulation. His most recent work includes analyses of pre-auction and buy-out offers in auctions, equilibria in multi-sender signaling games, and the role of market transparency in repeated oligopoly.
Selected Research Publications
P.B. Overgaard, 1994, The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources, Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, 452-478.
S. Albæk, H.P. Møllgaard and P.B. Overgaard, 1997, Government Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case, Journal of Industrial Economics 45, 429-443.
M.N. Hertzendorf and P.B. Overgaard, 2001, Price Competition and Advertising Signals - Signaling by Competing Senders, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10: 621-662.
R. Orzach, P.B. Overgaard and Y. Tauman, 2002, Modest Advertising Signals Strength, RAND Journal of Economics 33: 340-358.
R. Kirkegaard and P.B. Overgaard, 2008, Pre-Auction offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions, Games and Economic Behavior 63: 145-165.
R. Kirkegaard and P.B. Overgaard, 2008, Buy-Out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demand, RAND Journal of Economics 39: 770-789.
Per Baltzer Overgaard is currently teaching an MSc class in The Economics of Competition and Regulation. Over the years, he has taught Microeconomic Theory at all levels. More generally, he has taught Economics of Information and Contracting, Auctions and Mechanisms, Game Theory, Economics of Business Strategy, Industrial Organization, as well as Antitrust and Regulation.
